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Abstract
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) researchers continue to study the 
potential for lithium and lithium-ion battery thermal runaway from an internal short circuit in 
equipment for use in underground coal mines. Researchers conducted cell crush tests using a 
plastic wedge within a 20-L explosion-containment chamber filled with 6.5% CH4-air to simulate 
the mining hazard. The present work extends earlier findings to include a study of LiFePO4 cells 
crushed while under charge, prismatic form factor LiCoO2 cells, primary spiral-wound constructed 
LiMnO2 cells, and crush speed influence on thermal runaway susceptibility. The plastic wedge 
crush was a more severe test than the flat plate crush with a prismatic format cell. Test results 
indicate that prismatic Saft MP 174565 LiCoO2 and primary spiral-wound Saft FRIWO M52EX 
LiMnO2 cells pose a CH4-air ignition hazard from internal short circuit. Under specified test 
conditions, A123 systems ANR26650M1A LiFePO4 cylindrical cells produced no chamber 
ignitions while under a charge of up to 5 A. Common spiral-wound cell separators are too thin to 
meet intrinsic safety standards provisions for distance through solid insulation, suggesting that a 
hard internal short circuit within these cells should be considered for intrinsic safety evaluation 
purposes, even as a non-countable fault. Observed flames from a LiMnO2 spiral-wound cell after a 
chamber ignition within an inert atmosphere indicate a sustained exothermic reaction within the 
cell. The influence of crush speed on ignitions under specified test conditions was not statistically 
significant.
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1. Introduction
Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries have become one of the most popular types of rechargeable 
battery for portable electronics. Li-ion technology provides enhanced energy storage 
capabilities that lengthen device runtime, shorten the recharge time, and extend the life of 
the battery. Beyond consumer electronics, Li-ion batteries are now growing in popularity for 
underground mine safety equipment such as cap lamps and communications and tracking 
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equipment. Chemistry, performance, cost, and safety characteristics vary across lithium 
battery types. Portable electronics often use Li-ion batteries with lithium cobalt oxide 
(LiCoO2) cathodes, which offer high energy density, but have well-known thermal runaway 
safety concerns. Safety concerns specific to underground coal mine fire and explosion 
hazards from LiCoO2 cells were described previously (Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 2013). 
A Li-ion powered Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) permissible device was 
involved in a thermal event in an underground coal mine. An investigative report of the 
incident is not publically available.
Researchers with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Office of Mine 
Safety and Health Research (NIOSH, OMSHR) continue to study Li-ion battery thermal 
runaway potential in order to develop safety recommendations for underground coal mine 
applications.1 The study includes an experimental evaluation of potential thermal runaway 
initiating events of cells placed within CH4-air atmospheres to simulate a mining explosion 
hazard. The study focused on internal short circuits induced by external mechanical damage, 
with this failure mechanism known to produce thermal runaway in Li-ion cells. NIOSH 
researchers previously reported on a new method of inducing internal short circuit for 
thermal runaway susceptibility evaluation purposes that overcomes some limitations of the 
flat plate and nail penetration methods (Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 2013). The present 
work extends earlier findings to include a study of:
• LiFePO4 cells crushed while under charge.
• prismatic form factor LiCoO2 cells.
• crush speed influence on thermal runaway susceptibility.
• primary, spiral-wound constructed LiMnO2 cells.
2. Background/literature review
Li-ion thermal runaway hazards continue to be a concern. Wang et al., (2012) reviewed Li-
ion battery fire and explosion accidents, and reported tens of thousands of mobile phone 
fires or explosions from various causes since 2006. They also listed several accidents 
involving large format LiFePO4 batteries used in electric vehicles. Underwriters 
Laboratories (UL) (2013a) found that since March 2012, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) documented 467 reported incidents that identified Li-ion cells as the 
battery type involved, with 353 of those being incidents involving fire/burn hazards. The UL 
report date suggests the CPSC incidents occurred within a period of slightly more than 1 
year. The UL report emphasized the need to update existing standards and create new ones 
as our information and knowledge of potential Li-ion battery hazards increase. Li-ion battery 
failures grounded the Boeing 787 airliner fleet for several months over thermal runaway 
concerns with the batteries (NTSB, 2013). Li-ion or lithium cells were possibly linked to 
several cargo plane incidents, including two fatal crashes (GCAA, 2013) (Brett, 2011).
1The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
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Several studies suggest the need for more emphasis on the safety aspects of Li-ion 
technology. Barnett et al., (2013) assert that Li-ion battery safety issues are not met with the 
same scientific and technical rigor that apply to other aspects of Li-ion technology. Doughty 
and Roth (2012) propose that safety is often a property determined after the development 
phase of Li-ion technology, and that safety and thermal stability should become a prime 
consideration in the initial development and material selection phase. Roth and Orendorff 
(2012) reviewed research of nonflammable electrolytes, and contend that “electrolyte 
additives proposed to reduce gas generation and mitigate flammability have not gained 
much traction, in general, because of the tradeoff in performance.” UL notes that current 
safety standards do not address the potential impact of battery aging, and initial results have 
led the company to expand its safety research program. For example, UL (2013b) observed 
that aging adversely impacted the safety performance of a selected 2.8 Ah 18650 type 
LiCoO2 cell.
Spiral-wound Li-ion cells use a thin separator material to insulate the anode from the 
cathode (Fig. 1). Physical damage to this separator causes an internal short circuit that may 
lead to catastrophic heating events. Some separator materials have shutdown properties that 
can provide a margin of safety against certain failure modes, including internal short 
circuits, that result in an elevated cell temperature. However, some potential safety issues 
remain. Baldwin (2009) reviewed separator materials and functions for lithium-based 
batteries used in aerospace missions, and suggests the shutdown mechanism would provide 
very little protection from an internal short circuit accompanied by a rapid internal heating 
rate. The thickness of commercial separator materials reviewed were <30 µm. Orendorff 
(2012) discussed challenges with designing safe Li-ion cell separators, including some 
tradeoffs between mechanical robustness and porosity/transport (performance) properties, 
primarily for large format cells. The thicknesses of four varieties of commercial separators 
reviewed were approximately 25 µm. Orendorff concluded that ceramic/polymer composites 
and high melting point polymer materials offer some improvement in thermal stability and 
abuse tolerance for Li-ion cell separators but, in general, there needs to be more evaluation 
work dedicated to quantifying the safety impact of new separators, particularly for large 
format cells.
Barnett et al., (2013) emphasize internal short circuit hazards from metallic dendritic growth 
through separators, where metal particles on (and possibly in) the cathode dissolve and plate 
out on the anode, growing back through the separator, leading to an internal short circuit. 
They note that ceramic layers are sometimes implemented as porous coatings on electrodes 
or as separators as a means of enhancing Li-ion battery safety. In limited testing of cells 
containing ceramic layers, they observed formation of internal shorts from dendritic growth, 
including internal short circuits that matured to thermal runaway.
Recent studies (Ong et al., 2010) (Zaghib et al., 2012) demonstrate some safety aspects of 
LiFePO4 positive electrode materials compared to some other materials. The relative safety 
of LiFePO4 is generally attributed to limited O2 release upon high temperature 
decomposition. Previous research (Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 2013) found that selected 
LiFePO4 cells did not cause ignition when crushed within CH4-air mixtures under specified 
test conditions. In the current study, additional tests were conducted to crush selected 
Dubaniewicz and DuCarme Page 3













LiFePO4 cells while charging within normal charging conditions. These tests simulated a 
CH4 ignition hazard involving underground stationary Li-ion battery-powered equipment 
that is on charge and unattended, while maintaining a single fault condition of a crush-
induced internal short circuit.
NIOSH previously contracted with QinetiQ North America (QNA) to perform a safety 
assessment of emergency backup batteries and battery charging systems for underground 
mining applications (QNA, 2009). QNA reviewed safety aspects of several primary lithium 
cell chemistries, including LiMnO2. The company reported that LiMnO2 cells have shown 
resilience against many types of abuse testing, including short circuit, over-discharge, 
puncture, and crush. Overall, LiMnO2 has been proven as one of the most robust primary 
cell types on the market today, still in use despite being one of the first-pioneered lithium 
technologies. Further, LiMnO2 is one of the safest of Li technologies as long as the supplier 
is reputable and battery pack design has been appropriately tested. QNA concluded that 
LiMnO2 is a good candidate power source for an underground primary-cell application. In 
the current study, researchers included a commercial LiMnO2 cell marketed for intrinsically 
safe (IS) equipment, for evaluation as a potentially safe cell for powering IS mining 
equipment. An intrinsic safety evaluation test report for the cell was obtained for 
comparison purposes (DEKRA, 2011).
Li-ion cell vent gases may be flammable or inert, and the volume of vent gases from thermal 
runaway is substantial. Roth and Orendorff (2012) and Roth (2008) found that cell venting 
before thermal runaway is achieved may release flammable solvent vapor into the 
surrounding environment, which may then be ignited by an adequate ignition source. In 
contrast, they also found that the decomposition vent gases from Li-ion cells undergoing 
thermal runaway are not inherently combustible, and may act to inert the surrounding 
atmosphere. Further, thermal runaway typically produces high-rate gas generation from the 
decomposition of the organic solvents. Measurements of gas released from cells during 
thermal runaway using several different cathode materials showed “that the volumes of gas 
released at the end of the thermal runaway peak (typically 350 °C) were all nearly equal”, 
and approximately 1200 mL/Ah.
Standard IEC 62133 recognizes cell crushing as reasonably foreseeable misuse (IEC, 2012). 
IEC 62133 edition 2.0 contains revised crush test procedures. A new test provision indicates 
that once a 10% deformation with flat plates has occurred, the force is to be released. This 
new provision suggests that a cell may deform by 10% at forces significantly less than the 
13 kN maximum force, at which point the force is released. Previous research (Dubaniewicz 
and DuCarme, 2013) found that a sample of cylindrical Li-ion cells crushed by flat plates 
deformed by approximately 18% without any adverse outcomes; similar cells readily ignited 
when crushed by a plastic wedge. IEC 62133 edition 2 has also eliminated a narrow side 
crush test of prismatic cells. Mikolajczak et al., (2011) demonstrated that crushing the edge 
of cells is more likely to cause cell thermal runaway than crush or penetration perpendicular 
to electrode surfaces, in agreement with findings by Maleki and Howard (2009). In the 
current study, researchers included a sample of prismatic cells to extend previous research to 
compare crush characteristics between a flat plate and a plastic wedge method.
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Barnett et al., (2013) mention impact speed in a discussion of potential “gaming” of cell 
level safety standard tests. Crush or nail penetration speeds identified in the literature vary 
significantly. An amended 5th edition of the UN manual of tests specifies a 1.5-cm/s flat 
plate crush speed (UN, 2011). Neither IEC 62133 ed. 2.0 nor UL 1642 ed. 5 (UL, 2013c) 
specify a flat plate crush speed. The IEC 62133 ed. 2.0 forced internal short circuit test 
specifies a much slower 0.1-mm/s crush speed. A proposed UL indentation-induced internal 
short circuit test indicates a constant speed in the range of 0.01–0.1 mm/s (UL, 2013d). Spek 
and Hosseinifar (2012) discussed efforts to improve nail penetration test methods, and 
concluded that a 100-cm/s nail speed showed a strong tendency to produce adverse 
outcomes (100%, 6 samples) in large format Li-ion cells tested. Although not included in the 
conclusions, much slower nail speeds (1.1 cm/s) produced a similar rate of adverse 
outcomes (100%, 4 samples). Ichimura (2007) suggests that a slower nail penetration speed 
may produce more adverse results due to internal resistance considerations. Spotnitz and 
Franklin (2003) reported on nail tests performed by Dahn using 18650 LiCoO2 cells. Using 
a nail with an embedded thermocouple, the nail temperature exceeded 600 °C when forced 
slowly into the cell to a depth of <4.5 mm. However, with a fast, deep nail penetration (7.5 
mm), the nail temperature did not exceed 140 °C. Penetration speed was not specified. 
Based on Dahn's results, perhaps a sufficiently slow penetration may produce thermal 
runaway before maximum penetration is achieved, minimizing the influence of penetration 
depth. In testing reported here, interim results with a prismatic cell produced a limited 
number of ignitions, providing an opportunity to run another set of tests with similar cells 
using a different crush speed, to assess the influence of selected crush speeds using the 
Fisher's Exact Test (Rosner, 1990).
ACRI2001 (MSHA, 2008) and ANSI/ISA-60079-11 (ANSI/ISA, 2012) intrinsic safety 
standards provide requirements for separation distances through solid insulation. ACRI2001 
stipulates a 0.5-mm minimum distance through solid insulation for voltages up to 60 V. If 
the separation between two conductors is less than one-third of this 0.5-mm value, 
ACRI2001 stipulates that the conductors are to be considered normally connected, if 
connection impairs intrinsic safety. Such shorting of conductors is not to be considered a 
fault in the analysis. That is, such a short is considered as a non-countable fault, allowing 
MSHA to apply up to two countable faults for intrinsic safety evaluation purposes. ANSI/
ISA-60079-11 ANNEX F lists a 0.2-mm separation distance through solid insulation, for all 
over-voltages listed, for both “ia” and “ib” Levels of Protection. If separation distances are 
less than one-third of the values specified, they shall be considered as subject to non-
countable short-circuit faults, if this impairs intrinsic safety. Neither ACRI2001 nor 
ANSI/ISA 60079-11 requirements for distance through solid insulation are currently applied 
to internal Li-ion cell constructions. These standards rely on other cell level standards to 
help ensure intrinsic safety in potentially explosive environments (Dubaniewicz and 
DuCarme, 2013).
Standard ANSI/ISA 60079-0 (ANSI/ISA, 2013) provides general requirements for explosion 
protection techniques covered by the ANSI/ISA 60079 series of standards. These are the US 
adopted versions of the IEC 60079 series of standards. ANSI/ISA 60079-0 indicates that 
additional consideration and additional testing may be required for equipment operating 
outside of normal air oxygen content, i.e., oxygen enriched atmospheres. Further, potential 
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ignition sources from exothermic chemical reactions are not addressed by the standard, and 
equipment with such ignition sources should be subjected to a hazard analysis that identifies 
and lists all of the potential sources of ignition by the electrical equipment and the measures 
to be applied to prevent them from becoming effective. Ong et al., (2010) found that LiCoO2 
may release significant amounts of O2 during thermal runaway decomposition. Ignition 
pressures on the order of 10.8 MPa (1560 psi) have been reported for certain spiral-wound 
LiCoO2 cells (Jhu et al., 2011) (Yen et al., 2011). The excessive O2 generation and the high 
thermal runaway pressures reported suggest that certain spiral-wound LiCoO2 cells may be 
considered as strong oxidizers and potential exothermic chemical reaction ignition sources 
for ANSI/ISA 60079-0 purposes.
3. Methods and materials
NIOSH researchers conceived a new method of inducing internal short circuit for thermal 
runaway susceptibility evaluation purposes that was thought to overcome limitations of the 
flat plate and nail penetration methods (Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 2013). The new method 
employs a 90° wedge-shaped plastic fixture in place of the UL flat plate to compress the 
cell. A plastic material was selected to minimize electrical and thermal energy dissipation by 
the test fixture itself. The wedge shape and point angle are designed to be robust enough to 
crush the cell without significant damage to the plastic wedge itself. A plastic fixture 
simulates external forces applied to plastic-wrapped or encased battery packs which are 
common (Mikolajczak et al., 2011). Numerous field failures have been linked to latent 
mechanical damage (Mikolajczak et al., 2011). Researchers also conducted a series of tests 
with flat plates to simulate the UL 1642 crush tests as an experimental control for tests with 
the plastic wedge. A hydraulic ram extension with a 13-mm-thick flat plate was fabricated 
from steel and used to perform these tests.
3.1. Methods
A custom hydraulic press (Fig. 2), designed and fabricated to fit inside a 20-L explosion-
containment chamber, was used for these experiments. The press uses a small single-acting 
hydraulic cylinder with a 43-mm bore and 54-mm stroke. The cylinder ram is retracted by 
an internal spring when hydraulic fluid is released. A cutaway view of the press is shown 
below. The top and bottom plates are connected with a steel tube (not shown for clarity) that 
has access holes for installing the battery and plastic wedge or flat plate. A commercially 
available 0.75-kW hydraulic power unit supplies the hydraulic pressure, and the system 
relief valve is set to allow 13 kN of force at the cylinder ram. The press is controlled from a 
solenoid-operated four-way hydraulic valve. A bleed-in flow control is used to regulate the 
speed of the ram. The complete hydraulic system schematic is shown in Fig. 3.
Tests using the plastic wedge were completed at two different crush speeds. The nominal 
rates were 5 mm/s for the fast ram speed and 0.5 mm/s for the slow rate. Due to temperature 
and viscosity variations, the actual ram speed varies by a slight amount from test to test as 
documented in the Results section. Ram speed adjustment precision was limited with this 
setup because it is an open loop control system. Researchers investigated using a hydraulic 
cylinder with an internal linear variable differential transformer to enable closed loop 
control of the ram speed. Unfortunately, no such cylinder could be found that would fit 
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inside the chamber. Viatran model 248 pressure transducer measurements were used to 
calculate cylinder force.
Cell crush tests were conducted within the 20-L chamber filled with 6.5% CH4-air. The 
concentration of the gas-air mixture was determined by partial pressures and set to 100 kPa 
(14.5 psi) at room temperature. The CH4 source purity was specified as 99.97%. Subsequent 
tests at 40 °C raised the chamber pressure slightly above atmospheric, and researchers bled 
off a small amount of gas to maintain 100 kPa (14.5 psi) after the temperature stabilized. 
The term “overpressure” refers to the peak chamber pressure above 100 kPa. A fan within 
the chamber provided mixing. Chamber headspace volume was approximately 18 L. Crush 
tests with the plastic wedge were conducted at 40 °C. Researchers waited at least 1 h after 
the cell surface temperature reached 38 °C before conducting ignition tests at 40 °C. Crush 
tests with flat plates were conducted at room temperatures per UL 1642. The rationale for 
chamber temperature selections was explained previously (Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 
2013). To determine if a flammable atmosphere was still present, a hot-surface furnace 
igniter placed inside the chamber was activated after tests that did not result in an ignition.
A personal computer-based Labview data acquisition program recorded cell voltages, 
pressure transducer signals, and thermocouple measurements. A chamber pressure 
transducer detected ignitions in conjunction with a high-speed video camera. The criterion 
for ignition was an overpressure of at least 50 kPa (7.25 psi), a value derived from previous 
explosibility research (Cashdollar and Hertzberg, 1985) (Cashdollar, 2000). Sapphire 
windows allowed viewing inside the chamber. A high-speed video camera (NAC model 
512SC) recorded tests at 250 frames per second. A white LED fixture was placed within the 
chamber to provide illumination for video recording. An independent laboratory calibrated 
in-house multimeters and a thermocouple calibration cell traceable to the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST). A battery analyzer was calibrated by the 
manufacturer. Kapton tape was used to attach the thermocouple to the cell can, and to cover 
the bottom metal platen for insulation purposes.
A current limiting power supply (Acopian EP015MX500) was connected to selected 
LiFePO4 cells for crush tests while under charge. These tests simulated a CH4 ignition 
hazard involving underground stationary Li-ion battery powered equipment that is on charge 
and unattended. The power supply voltage was set to the maximum cell charge voltage 
recommended by the cell manufacturer. The test protocol called for limiting the power 
supply current to the maximum charge current recommended by the manufacturer, or 5 A, 
whichever amperage was less. The 5-A limit would maintain the charging circuit parameters 
within the safe region of the resistive circuit CH4 ignition curves of ACRI2001 and 
ANSI/ISA 60079-11. The maximum recommended charge current for the selected LiFePO4 
cells exceeded 5 A, so the 5-A limit was selected for these tests. The charging parameters 
maintained the single fault condition of an internal short circuit induced by crush.
A Vencon UBA5 Battery Analyzer preconditioned and analyzed cells for testing (Table 1). 
A software package provided user configurable routines for constant current, constant 
voltage cycling, and for measuring resistance and capacity. The resistance routine uses a 
two-step DC measurement. Cell resistance was measured on fully charged cells.
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Researchers disassembled a sample of each cell and measured the thickness of the cell 
separator using a scanning electron microscope (SEM) (Table 1).
3.2. Lithium-ion cells
A123 systems2 model ANR26650M1A cylindrical 26650 format LiFePO4 cells (M1A cells) 
were selected for crush tests while under charge. The M1A cells were conditioned prior to 
the test (Table 1) and fully charged before placing the cells in the 20-L chamber. The power 
supply was connected to the cell just prior to the crush test. The power supply was set to 3.8 
V with a 5-A current limit. The M1A cells were purchased through a battery distributor.
A Saft MP 174565 Integration™ medium prismatic cell is marketed for use in potentially 
explosible atmospheres as compliant with the IEC 60079-11 intrinsic safety standard (class 
T4 assignment between −20 °C and +40 °C) (Saft, 2009). The medium prismatic spiral-
wound cell features a LiCoO2-based cathode and organic solvent electrolyte. Built-in 
redundant safety protections include a shutdown separator, circuit breaker, and safety vent. 
Both cell terminals are located at the top of the cell. Samples of the cells were purchased 
through a battery distributor. Received cells were specified by the battery distributor as MP 
174565 (MP cells).
Saft FRIWO model M52EX cylindrical “C” format LiMnO2 primary cells (M52EX cells) 
are designed to be in compliance with the IEC 60079-11 intrinsic safety standard (FRIWO, 
2012) (Saft, 2012) (DEKRA, 2011). The spiral-wound constructed M52EX cell features 
several safety devices, including a shutdown separator and safety vent. A sample of M52EX 
cells were purchased through a battery distributor. Each cell had a label warning of fire, 
explosion, and severe burn hazard as well as do not recharge, crush, disassemble, heat above 
100 °C, or incinerate. A cell was discharged for a capacity measurement (Table 1.). A 
separate cell was used for the resistance measurement. Neither of these two cells was crush 
tested.
Researchers purchased more cells of each type described above than tested. A random 
sequence generator provided a random set of serial numbers assigned to all purchased cells. 
Tested cells were a random sample of those purchased.
4. Results
4.1. M1A LiFePO4 cells
Researchers conducted a series of ten plastic wedge crush tests of the fully charged M1A 
cells while connected to a charging circuit. The crush apparatus was placed in the 20-L 
chamber filled with 6.5% CH4-air and the cell was maintained at 40 °C. Charge current was 
limited to 5 A to maintain charging parameters within the safe region of the IS resistive 
circuit ignition curves. The charging circuit was connected a few seconds before the crush. 
None of the M1A cells crushed under charge ignited the chamber atmosphere. High-speed 
2Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH). In addition, citations to Web sites external to NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations 
or their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these Web sites. All Web addresses 
referenced in this document were accessible as of the publication date.
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video showed all M1A cells rupturing and producing smoke near the point where the wedge 
penetrated the can (Fig. 4). Two cells ruptured such that the cells opened electrically within 
a few seconds and stopped the charge current; these two tests were repeated with other cells. 
The charge circuit was disconnected after 2 min accompanied by a significant cell 
temperature drop. These ruptured cells exposed the cell's internals and cooled relatively 
quickly compared to the MP and M52EX cells. One test produced a few luminous sparks 
without igniting the chamber atmosphere. Voltage and current time traces indicated that the 
cells hard-shorted before the cell ruptured. These tests produced chamber overpressures of 
<20 kPa (2.9 psi) when the cells ruptured (Table 2). The furnace igniter subsequently ignited 
the chamber atmosphere for all of these tests, confirming a flammable atmosphere was 
present.
4.2. MP prismatic LiCoO2 cells
Researchers conducted three series of crush tests with the prismatic cells. The first series 
used flat plates to simulate the UL 1642 method as a comparison point for tests using the 
plastic wedge. The second series used the plastic wedge at a crush rate similar to that used 
for the flat plates. Interim results with this second series of tests produced a limited number 
of ignitions, providing an opportunity to conduct a third series of tests with a slower crush 
rate, to assess the potential influence of selected crush speeds using the Fisher's exact test.
4.2.1. MP cells, flat plates—Researchers conducted five flat plate crush tests using the 
Saft MP cells placed within 6.5% CH4-air. These tests were conducted at room temperature 
per UL 1642. The crush was applied to the wide side of the cells using 13 kN cylinder force 
and approximately 6 mm/s crush speed. These flat plate tests produced no ignitions in five 
attempts. No cell venting, temperature increase, chamber overpressure, or voltage drop was 
apparent from the high-speed videos or sensor time traces. After a 5-min wait period, the 
chamber atmosphere was ignited by the furnace igniter for these flat plate tests, verifying a 
flammable atmosphere was present. The flat plate compressed the cells by approximately 
4%. These flat plate tests provided some assurance that the MP cell samples were compliant 
with UL 1642 crush test requirements.
4.2.2. MP cells, plastic wedge—Researchers conducted a series of ten plastic wedge 
crush tests using the Saft MP cells placed within 6.5% CH4-air at 40 °C ambient. The crush 
was applied to the wide side of the cells, with the wedge tip parallel to the top of the cells. 
The crush speed was approximately 6 mm/s and cell penetration was limited to 
approximately 66%. The cells hard-shorted to a voltage of <50 mV in all ten tests and 
ignited the chamber atmosphere in three of these tests. Table 3 lists summary data for the 
three chamber ignitions. The wedge tip penetrated the cell can for all tests. After a 5-min 
wait period accompanied by a significant temperature drop, the furnace igniter ignited the 
chamber atmosphere for cells that did not ignite the chamber atmosphere.
4.2.3. MP cells, plastic wedge, slower crush—The next series of ten tests with the 
Saft MP cells and plastic wedge used a slower crush speed of approximately 0.43 mm/s 
(avg. of crush speeds in Table 4.). The cells were placed within 6.5% CH4-air at 40 °C. The 
crush was again applied to the wide side of the cells with the wedge tip parallel to the top of 
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the cells (Fig. 5). Cell penetration was limited to approximately 66%. The cells hard-shorted 
to a negative voltage level in all ten tests. The wedge tip penetrated the cell can for all tests. 
Evidence of thermal runaway was observed in six of the ten tests, with cell can temperatures 
exceeding 372 °C and chamber overpressures exceeding the selected ignition criteria of 50 
kPa (7.25 psi). Three of these thermal runaway events produced chamber overpressures 
ranging from 655 to 676 kPa. Three other thermal runaway events produced lower 
overpressures ranging from 65 to 72 kPa. The high-speed video recordings for the low 
overpressure thermal runaway events were obscured by smoke, but a bright flash was 
discernible through the smoke. The furnace igniter was unable to ignite the chamber 
atmosphere following the three lower overpressure thermal runaway events, indicating that 
there was no longer a flammable atmosphere within the chamber. The lower and higher 
overpressure thermal runaway events produced similar peak cell can temperatures.
Four of the slower crush tests produced no evidence of thermal runaway, with peak 
temperatures of <104 °C and chamber overpressures of <2 kPa. The high-speed video 
recordings were obscured by smoke without the bright flash observed for the six thermal 
runaway events. After a 5-min wait period accompanied by a significant temperature drop, 
the furnace igniter ignited the chamber atmosphere for these four tests, producing 
overpressures of 579–655 kPa (Table 4).
4.3. M52EX primary LiMnO2 cells
Researchers next conducted a series of plastic wedge crush tests using the M52EX cells 
placed within 6.5% CH4-air at 40 °C. The crush speed was approximately 0.6 mm/s and cell 
penetration was limited to approximately 66%. A slower crush speed was selected for this 
series because slower crush speeds produced twice as many ignitions as the faster crush 
speeds with the MP cells. The slower crush induced deeper voltage drops as well. The series 
was stopped after observing a fourth ignition in six tests per the testing protocol 
(Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 2013). The cells hard-shorted to a voltage of <0.9 V for all 
tests. High-speed video showed fluid flowing from the negative terminal vent after internal 
shorting for all tests, and prior to ignition for tests that produced ignitions. Flame emanated 
from the negative terminal vent for one chamber ignition. Flames and sparks emanated from 
elsewhere through the cell can for the other three chamber ignitions. In one test the cell 
continued to emit flames and sparks through holes burned through the cell can (Fig. 6) after 
the chamber ignition, suggesting the cell was supplying its own oxygen source, as the 
chamber oxygen was mostly consumed by the chamber ignition. Another chamber ignition 
produced a relatively high 608 °C peak temperature with a 745 kPa chamber overpressure 
(Table 5). The cell contents were expelled during this test, likely allowing flame from the 
chamber ignition to heat the inner metal can surface in contact with the thermocouple.
5. Discussion
Mikolajczak et al, (2011) reported investigating hundreds of thermal runaway events from 
the field. These included numerous field failures caused by latent mechanical damage, 
particularly of soft pouch cells where mild mechanical damage did not cause immediate 
failure, but rather the cells failed during subsequent cycling. With numerous new reports of 
Li-ion field failures, UL emphasizes the need to update existing standards and create new 
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ones as our information and knowledge of potential Li-ion battery hazards increase. Taken 
together, the new IEC 62133 edition 2 crush test provisions suggest that edition 2 provides 
less stringent crush hazard evaluation criteria than found in the previous edition. Flat plate 
tests with the prismatic cell reported here and with cylindrical cells reported previously 
(Dubaniewicz and DuCarme, 2013) produced no adverse results. Similar cells readily 
ignited the chamber atmosphere with the plastic wedge crush, using a fraction of the 13 kN 
force specified for the flat plate test. Field events and laboratory research suggest a need for 
a more invasive (e.g. wedge) crush test for cell level safety evaluations.
The fire triangle provides a simple model for describing thermal runaway events (Fig. 7). Li-
ion cell elements that may contribute to thermal runaway are shown on the corresponding 
leg of the triangle. The three legs of the triangle are isolated by a thin separator within 
spiral-wound constructed cells. Spiral-wound cells also feature high current discharge, 
enhancing heat generation from internal short circuits. A Li-ion cell thermal runaway event 
may be prevented by removing any leg of the triangle.
The M1A cells crushed while under charge produced no chamber ignitions. A delithiated 
LiFePO4 cathode produces relatively little O2 upon thermal decomposition (Ong et al., 
2010) (Zaghib et al., 2012), and thus inhibits the development of thermal runaway inside of 
the cell by weakening the oxidizer leg of the triangle. Other potential failure modes should 
be considered, as appropriate. Thermal events involving large format LiFePO4 batteries have 
been reported (Wang et al., 2012). Larger capacity LiFePO4 cells may produce 
correspondingly more O2 and higher internal short circuit currents than smaller capacity 
cells that might favor an internal thermal reaction. As another example of a potential failure 
mode, a cell breach may expose electrolyte fuel vapors to oxidizing air, thus creating a 
flammable fuel-air mixture. Such a flammable mixture may be ignited by a competent 
ignition source. The ANSI/ISA 60079 series of explosion protection standards anticipate 
equipment exposure to flammable atmospheres, and provide design requirements that may 
serve to minimize the risk of ignition under a number of foreseeable fault conditions 
external to a LiFePO4 cell. A multi-phase safety approach for large capacity Li-ion cells 
conceivably could provide a more robust cell-level safety solution. A weakly oxidizing 
cathode, flame retardant electrolyte and anode, and shutdown separator combined would 
help to minimize and isolate two legs of the triangle other than the heat source represented 
by the large electrical capacity.
Tests with the MP cells produced two types of thermal events characterized by higher or 
lower chamber overpressures. The lower overpressure events produced an inert atmosphere 
as verified by the furnace igniter. The lower overpressure events likely involved cell thermal 
runaway with vent gases of sufficient volume to inert the chamber atmosphere as described 
by Roth and Orendorff (2012) and Roth (2008). All thermal events produced peak cell can 
temperatures exceeding 327 °C and met the ignition criteria of a pressure rise of at least 50 
kPa (7.25 psi).
Researchers used the Fisher's exact test to assess the potential influence of selected crush 
speeds (6.0 vs. 0.43 mm/s) on ignitions with the MP cells. The Fisher's exact test is used 
when data are analyzed in the form of a 2 × 2 contingency table and the expected value of at 
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least one cell in the table is <5. The null hypothesis was that crushed cell samples using two 
different speeds were equally likely to ignite under otherwise similar test conditions. The 
selected alternative hypothesis was that the slower crush speeds were more likely to produce 
ignitions than the faster crush speeds, indicating the use of a one-tailed probability test. An 
SPSS statistical package computed Fisher's exact test p values using data listed in Table 6. 
The one-tailed p value for Table 6 data is 0.1849. Although twice as many thermal events 
were observed for the slower crush speeds, the influence of crush speed is not considered to 
be statistically significant for these tests. A wider variation in crush speeds conceivably may 
produce more significant results. The selected slower crush speeds were near the limit of the 
testing equipment.
M52EX cell intrinsic safety evaluations included a set of external short circuit tests 
(DEKRA, 2011). Eleven cells were subjected to external short circuit at various ambient 
temperatures ranging from −25 °C to +70 °C. The external short circuits produced 
maximum short circuit currents ranging from 30 to 70 A, with maximum cell temperatures 
ranging from 98 °C to 113 °C. No visible changes to the cells were reported (no “bombage,” 
bursting, damage, or leakage). By comparison, the plastic wedge produced short circuits 
within the M52EX cells, which then frequently ignited the chamber atmosphere.
Common Li-ion cell separators are less than 30 µm thick (Baldwin, 2009) (Orendorff, 2012). 
These separators are too thin to meet intrinsic safety standards provisions for distance 
through solid insulation (MSHA, 2008) (ANSI/ISA, 2012). Results reported here 
demonstrate that hard internal short circuits may impair intrinsic safety, and suggest that a 
hard internal short circuit within these spiral-wound Li-ion cells should be considered for 
intrinsic safety evaluation purposes, even as a non-countable fault. Results suggest that at 
least 4.8 Ah capacity for spiral wound LiCoO2 cells and 5.1 Ah capacity for spiral wound 
LiMnO2 cells may pose a thermal runaway hazard, even with a shutdown separator. 
Comparing the M52EX results with those from the DEKRA report indicate that external 
short circuits tests are not an adequate surrogate for evaluating internal short circuit hazards. 
Some steps are being taken to help address Li-ion thermal runaway hazards in explosion 
protection equipment design standards. The updated ANSI/ISA 60079-0 edition 6 indicates 
that the use of spiral-wound, lithium–cobalt-oxide cells is not recommended due to potential 
thermal runaway hazards resulting from internal short circuits.
6. Conclusions
A review of the safety research literature, field events, and laboratory testing suggest the 
need for a more invasive (e.g., wedge) crush test for cell level safety evaluations.
The plastic wedge crush was a more severe test than the flat plate crush with a prismatic 
format LiCoO2 cell. The plastic wedge produced deeper penetration and lower impedance 
(hard) shorting while using a fraction of the applied force of the flat plates.
Testing reported here indicates that Saft MP 174565 and Saft FRIWO M52EX cells pose a 
CH4-air ignition hazard from internal short circuit caused by crushing damage, even with 
shutdown separators.
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Under specified test conditions, A123 systems ANR26650M1A LiFePO4 cells produced no 
chamber ignitions while under a charge of up to 5 A. These tests simulated a potential CH4 
ignition hazard involving underground stationary Li-ion battery powered equipment that 
may short circuit internally under normal charging conditions. Other potential failure modes 
should be considered, as appropriate.
The influence of crush speed on ignitions under specified test conditions was not statistically 
significant. A wider variation in crush speeds conceivably may produce more significant 
results. The selected slower crush speeds were near the limit of the testing equipment.
Common spiral-wound cell separators are too thin to meet intrinsic safety standards 
provisions for distance through solid insulation. Results with selected LiCoO2 and LiMnO2 
spiral-wound cells demonstrate that hard internal short circuits may impair intrinsic safety as 
described within the ACRI2001 and ANSI/ISA 60079-11 standards, and suggest that a hard 
internal short circuit within these spiral-wound Li-ion and lithium cells should be considered 
for intrinsic safety evaluation purposes, even as a non-countable fault.
The literature indicates that spiral-wound LiCoO2 cells may produce significant amounts of 
oxygen and high pressures during thermal decomposition, suggesting that these cells may be 
considered as potentially strong oxidizers and exothermic chemical reaction ignition sources 
for ANSI/ISA 60079-0 purposes. Observed flames from a LiMnO2 spiral-wound cell after a 
chamber ignition within an inert atmosphere indicate a sustained exothermic chemical 
reaction in this cell as well. LiFePO4 cells may offer a safer alternative due to limited 
oxygen release upon thermal decomposition.
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A drawing of a common spiral-wound Li-ion cell construction with a thin separator material.
Dubaniewicz and DuCarme Page 16














Drawings of the plastic wedge and flat plate crush test fixtures.
Dubaniewicz and DuCarme Page 17















Dubaniewicz and DuCarme Page 18














An M1A cell crushed under charge ruptured but did not ignite the chamber atmosphere.
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An MP cell crushed by the plastic wedge at a slower speed that produced a lower 
overpressure thermal event. The cell swelled significantly.
Dubaniewicz and DuCarme Page 20














An M52EX cell crushed by the plastic wedge that ignited the chamber atmosphere with two 
holes burned through the side of the cell can.
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Fire triangle analogy for Li-ion cell thermal runaway.
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Table 1
Cell specifications and conditioning summary data.
M1A MP M52EX
Charge, discharge voltage 3.8, 2.0 4.2, 2.5 –, 2.0
Charge or discharge constant current (A) 3 2.4 0.2
End charge current (mA) 50 50 –
Rated capacity (Ah) 3.2 4.8 5.1
Measured discharge capacity (% rated) >100% >96% 101.7%
Measured resistance range (mΩ) 23 to 29 41 to 51 120
Measured separator thickness (µm) 20 20 40
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Table 2
Summary data, M1A cells crushed under charge, plastic wedge, 40 C, 6.5% CH4-air non-ignitions.
Cylinder force at short circuit kN (lbf) 1.83 to 3.18 (411–716)
Crush speed avg. (range) mm/s 3.9 (3.0–5.3)
Chamber overpressure kPa (psi) <20 (2.9)
Peak cell can temperatures °C 67 to 174
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Table 3
Summary data, MP cells, plastic wedge, 6 mm/s crush speed, 40 °C, 6.5% CH4-air ignitions.
Cylinder force at short circuit kN (lbf) 6.72 to 7.65 (1510–1720)
Crush speed avg. (range) mm/s 6.0 (4.8–7.3)
Chamber overpressure kPa (psi) 648 to 696 (94–101)
Peak cell can temperatures °C 327 to 510
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Table 4







Cylinder force at short circuit kN (lbf) 6.54 to 7.30 (1470–1640) 7.03 to 7.87 (1580–1770) 6.72 to 7.78 (1510–1750)
Crush speed avg. (range) mm/s 0.33 (0.2–0.46) 0.49 (0.44–0.58) 0.46 (0.3–0.66)
Chamber overpressure kPa (psi) 655 to 676 (95–98) 65 to 72 (9.4–10.4) <2 (0.3)
Furnace igniter overpressure kPa (psi) – – 579 to 655 (84–95)
Peak cell can temperatures °C 390 to 427 372 to 423 102 to 104
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Table 5
Summary data, M52EX cells, plastic wedge, 40 °C, 6.5% CH4-air ignitions.
Cylinder force at short circuit kN (lbf) 3.49 to 4.27 (784–960)
Crush speed avg. (range) mm/s 0.58 (0.52–0.69)
Chamber overpressure kPa (psi) 421 to 745 (61–108)
Peak cell can temperatures °C 340 to 608
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Table 6
Fisher's exact test comparison of crush speed influence on ignition using the MP cells.
MP cells Ignitions No ignitions Totals
Slower crush 6 4 10
Faster crush 3 7 10
Totals 9 11 20
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